Abstract: With the demise of health care reform at the national level, much of the attention has shifted to state-level efforts. Recently, several states have begun looking to the Medicaid program as a way to solve their health care problems. A principal way in which states are implementing health care reform is through the Section 1115 research and demonstration Medicaid waiver program. The 1115 waiver authority provides states considerable flexibility to restructure their Medicaid programs to offer health care to new populations and thus has great potential for covering large segments of the uninsured population. While it shows great promise, however, there are many obstacles states must overcome both in implementing and in maintaining an 1115 program.
I
n the absence of comprehensive health system reform at the federal level, many states have taken the initial steps toward reform on their own. But there are major constraints on state action, including political opposition to employer mandates and to tax increases. Because of these constraints, many states have begun to look to Medicaid expansions as a way of covering more of the uninsured. The attractiveness of Medicaid is easy to understand. The federal government will pay 50-83 percent of the costs of a state's Medicaid program. Given that the major barrier to expanded insurance coverage is financing, the ability of states to insure low-income Americans at less than the full cost is appealing.
Medicaid eligibility can be expanded in two ways. The first is through the 1902(r)(2) provisions of the Social Security Act, enacted in 1988, with further amendments in 1989 and 1990 . This statute permits states to extend Medicaid coverage to certain groups of categorically eligible beneficiaries using broader income and asset eligibility requirements than those that are applied to cash-assistance populations. In essence, the law permits states to expand coverage, but only to pregnant women, children under age nineteen, and qualified Medicare beneficiaries virtually without regard to income.' The practical constraint in using this mechanism is that states must bear their share of the cost for eligible persons.
The other Medicaid expansion authority is the Section 1115 research and demonstration waiver. These waivers are designed to permit states to develop innovative solutions to a variety of health and welfare problems. The federal government may waive a number of standard Medicaid rules, provided that the change is "budget-neutral"-that is, that the costs are no higher than would be expected in the absence of the waiver. Under the most recent wave of Section 1115 waivers in the past two years, states have requested authorization to expand coverage to the uninsured, using existing Medicaid funds to pay for the expansion. All of these states propose to achieve savings by using managed care plans to serve current Medicaid recipients and to limit the cost of new enrollees. States often propose using current disproportionate-share hospital payments to expand coverage, rather than using these funds to make lump-sum payments to hospitals. States also often propose to use savings from reductions in other state programs. In some cases, states propose new revenues. The end result is MEDICAID WAIVERS 201 that, in principle, coverage for the uninsured is expanded at relatively small new government cost, if any.
In this paper we use national data to illustrate the potential coverage and fiscal implications of these kinds of Medicaid expansions. We describe how Medicaid expansions are being financed, and we analyze obstacles states face in using 1115 waivers as vehicles to expanded Medicaid coverage.
The Models
The current Section 1115 waiver programs all involve an expansion of eligibility beyond Medicaid 's traditional categorical eligibility groups (women and children and the disabled) (Exhibit 1 with waiver programs contract or plan to contract with managed care organizations to provide a package of services, and the plans bear partial or full risk for the cost of providing these services. Some states shift their Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) populations into managed care plans; others place their entire Medicaid populations, including the noninstitutionalized blind and disabled, into managed care for acute care services only. Waiver states rely on an array of managed care organizations, from closed-panel health maintenance organizations (HMOs) to preferred provider organizations (PPOs) to discounted fee-for-service plans. Some reforms are leading to creation of new managed care organizations to serve Medicaid clients.
The waiver programs vary considerably in scope. TennCare is open to all Tennessee residents regardless of income or employment status, although there is a cap on the total number of enrollees. Florida's program would expand eligibility to all persons with incomes up to 250 percent of the federal poverty level (but with a cap on enrollment), while Oregon's and Kentucky's reforms, which would extend Medicaid coverage to all persons up to 100 percent of poverty, are more limited in scope.
The programs also vary in the way they are financed. The two most prominent sources are (1) savings resulting from the increased use of managed care by current and newly entitled enrollees, and (2) Medicaid disproportionate-share hospital funds diverted from state hospitals. States also rely on premium contributions from individuals and cuts in other state programs.
What Are The Stakes?
One of the key questions raised by these programs is, How far can states go in expanding coverage to the uninsured, and at what cost to federal and state governments? We estimated the impact of hypothetical expansions through Section 1115 waivers, with the intent of illustrating the potential impact of Medicaid expansions, assuming that all states adopted the same expansion policy. The results show that Medicaid expansions can cover many people and have a significant effect on the number of uninsured persons. They also suggest that the expansions could be quite costly or could require substantial savings from the current program.
The simulations required three steps. First, we used Current Population Survey (CPS) data as adjusted by The Urban Institute's TRIM2 microsimulation model to estimate those who would be newly eligible for Medicaid. This provided us not only with numbers of new eligibles, but also with their characteristics in terms of age and previous insurance status. Second, we made alternative assumptions about program participation. Third, we estimated the cost for each new enrollee based on the cost of the current Medicaid benefit package but adjusted for differences in new enrollees' age and previous insurance status. No disproportionate-share hospital payments were included in the estimates for current or new enrollees. We also made no assumptions about managed care savings for new enrollees. As such, these estimates are an indication of the amount of money that must be "saved" or financed with new revenues.
We estimated the number of enrollees and costs under two alternative types of Section 1115 waivers. The first assumes that the waiver program covers all persons below 100 percent of the federal poverty line; the second, below 200 percent. We also made two participation assumptions. In the low-participation scenarios, we assumed that 75 percent of persons who are now uninsured and who have incomes below poverty would participate. Because the Section 1115 expansions typically require persons to bear some share of the premium cost, we assumed that only 50 percent of uninsured persons above 100 percent of poverty would participate. We assumed that all of those who now purchase private nongroup policies would enroll in Medicaid because of the lower cost. In contrast, we assumed that employers would continue to provide coverage and that all persons who now have employer-sponsored coverage would continue to find that preferable. Under the high-participation assumption, we assumed that all persons who are now uninsured or have private nongroup policies would participate. We also assumed that all of those with employer-sponsored coverage and who meet the income criteria would drop their coverage and participate. Full participation in any of these Medicaid expansions is highly unlikely. We present these simulations simply to show the potential effects of these expansions on coverage and expenditures and to illustrate the effects of assumptions. They also illustrate the importance of employers' maintaining their financial support of health benefits.
Simulation results. Nationally, Medicaid now has 32.3 million nonelderly enrollees and spends $67.8 billion on acute care services. The first hypothetical 1115 waiver program assumes that coverage would be expanded to all nonelderly persons with incomes below 100 percent of poverty. Under the low-participation assumption, coverage would be extended to 8.3 million people at a cost to the government of $13.1 billion (Exhibit 2). Of the new enrollees, 6.5 million were previously uninsured (reducing the number of uninsured persons to 3 1.2 million), and another 1.8 million had private nongroup policies. Although not shown in the exhibit, approximately 6.7 million of the new enrollees are adults; this occurs because adults are less likely to be covered by Medicaid now.
Under the high-participation assumption, new enrollment would increase to 13.4 million at an additional cost to the government of $20.9 billion (Exhibit 2). Of the new enrollees, 8.6 million would be previously uninsured, and 3.0 million previously had employer coverage. Of the $20.9 billion in new expenditures, $4.5 billion represents expenditures on persons previously covered by employers. Again, under the high-participation assumption, most (10.1 million) of the new enrollees are adults. Extending coverage to adults accounts for $18 billion of the new expenditures.
In the second hypothetical expansion, in which Medicaid coverage is extended to all nonelderly persons up to 200 percent of poverty, we assumed that persons above poverty would bear some share of the premium costs in the following way: Persons between 100 percent and 149 percent of poverty would pay 25 percent of the premium, and those between 150 percent and 199 percent of poverty would pay 50 percent. The results show that under the low-participation assumption there would be 17.5 million new enrollees at a total cost of $27.4 billion (Exhibit 3). Of the new enrollees, 12.7 million were previously uninsured, and 4.8 million previously had purchased private nongroup policies, Because persons above 100 percent of poverty are required to bear some share of the premium, the cost to the government of expanding coverage to 200 percent of poverty is $22.1 billion, while individuals would pay $5.3 billion. Under the high-participation rate assumption, all of the uninsured below 200 percent of poverty would be covered. In addition, persons who now have employer-sponsored coverage and incomes below this level would enroll in Medicaid. The result is that 44.9 million people would be added to the Medicaid rolls at an additional cost of $67.3 billion. Of these new enrollees, 21.0 million previously lacked health insurance. Another 19.1 million formerly had employer-sponsored coverage. Because of individual premium contributions, the cost to the government is $49.4 billion. Of the new government expenditures, $25.1 billion was spent on those without health insurance and $6.2 billion on those who previously purchased private nongroup policies. Another $18.1 billion was spent on those who previously had employer-sponsored coverage.
These results demonstrate that Medicaid expansions can go far toward covering uninsured poor persons but that the fiscal implications are major. As many as 44.9 million persons would be eligible for Medicaid under an expansion that covered persons up to 200 percent of poverty, with the potential for substantially increasing costs to the federal and state governments if budget-neutrality requirements are not met. Since these programs are expected to be budget-neutral to the federal government, these cost estimates indicate the amount of "savings" or new state revenues that must be generated. These results also show that employers' decisions to continue coverage have major implications for the cost of these programs.
Where Will Financing Come From?
One of the requirements of Section 1115 waiver programs is that they be budget-neutral; that is, that their costs to the federal government over the life of the demonstration not be more than they would have been without the waivers. An exception to this is Oregon, where the federal government explicitly permitted spending additional resources relative to what would have been spent without reform. Also, some states such as Tennessee and Florida "project" that they will actually save money.
Current Medicaid dollars. If many more people are to be covered, but no new federal funds are to be spent, how will these programs be financed? 
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States believe that they can use existing dollars more efficiently to pay for expansion. First, states expect that managed care will yield lower per capita costs and/ or reduced spending growth, compared with the prior fee-forservice system. Instead of being used to reduce total spending, these savings can be used to expand coverage to more people. Every waiver state has assumed that savings can be achieved through managed care, whether through competitive bidding (Rhode Island and Hawaii) or through managed competition (Florida and Tennessee).
Second, many states that have Section 1115 waiver programs divert some or all of their disproportionate-share hospital payments from paying hospitals directly to financing expansion of insurance coverage to individuals. With new federal constraints on the use of such payments, some of these federal dollars might have been lost to the states if they had not received a waiver.
2 On the other hand, states that have more modest disproportionate-share programs, such as Oregon or Hawaii, are more constrained in their ability to finance coverage through this mechanism.
Third, some states propose cuts in other health programs or incorporate other health programs into Medicaid. For example, Hawaii folded its statefinanced health insurance programs (SHIP and General Assistance) into its new waiver program. Funds that would have been used for these programs are now used in the waiver program, allowing the state to obtain federal matching funds. In Tennessee state funds are transferred from other public health programs to the waiver program. Often these programs paid for services that are covered under the expansion, for example, services to persons with acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), family planning, and maternal and child health.
New dollars. In addition to new uses of "old" money, there is some infusion of new funds. One source is premium contributions or copayments from newly entitled low-income persons. None of the state programs (except Florida's) requires persons with incomes below 100 percent of the federal poverty line to contribute, but most require contributions from those above the poverty line. Typically, premiums increase with income, with full premium contributions at 200 or 300 percent of poverty. In general, premiums are eligible for federal matching payments. Cost sharing is also often required and effectively reduces government's premium costs.
Another way many, if not all, of the states are financing their waiver programs is through new federal money, despite the requirement of budgetneutrality. The primary way in which new federal resources are generated is through the states' baseline budget assumptions, that is, their estimates of spending without the waiver program. For example, suppose a state assumes a baseline in which Medicaid expenditures would have increased by 10 percent per year. If it also assumes that managed care will constrain spend- ing growth to just 5 percent per year, then the savings will accumulate over time, reaching about 25 percent by the fifth year. Most of the waivers propose to cover more people, and to spend more money, in the first year or two of the program but to balance this by savings in years three through five. But if, in reality, spending without reform would not have been as high as projected, then the result is new federal money for the state. The ultimate issue is whether baseline estimates are credible, which may be difficult to assess.
Another way to increase baseline spending projections to increase federal revenues is to assume hypothetical eligibility expansions. For example, Hawaii assumed that in the absence of the waiver, it would have expanded eligibility under 1902(r)(2) provisions, earning additional federal matching funds. These hypothetical new funds are included as part of the baseline federal costs against which federal budget-neutrality is judged.
Finally, states also may be using additional state revenues to fund their waiver programs. Oregon enacted a cigarette tax partly for this purpose, and Tennessee proposed using new general revenues to pay for its program. In the more ambitious programs, new revenues are required to generate higher federal matching payments. The increase in state revenues is typically not as great as the increase in federal revenues because, as discussed below, contributions are required of individuals, and states often transfer funds from other state health programs.
What Are The Obstacles?
If major expansion of coverage can be achieved with few new state revenue contributions, it would seem that states would jump at the opportunity.
3 But in reality there are many obstacles to using Medicaid waivers. Fiscal constraints. One set of obstacles relates to the amount of savings that can be generated from managed care. In some states, it may be difficult to establish capitation rates that will yield savings to the states when existing provider payment rates are already extremely low. For example, if Medicaid payment rates to physicians, hospitals, and other providers are already low, it may be hard to reduce current expenditures in order to finance expansions. Moreover, it is unrealistic to expect providers to enter into managed care arrangements in which either their fees are reduced or they are expected to accept financial risk, unless capitation rates are sufficiently attractive. In some states many Medicaid patients are already in managed care plans. Thus, the state cannot argue that it can generate savings through further use of managed care. At the other extreme, in some states there is little managed care penetration. These states may find it difficult to develop managed care arrangements quickly, although this has Another set of fiscal obstacles is the amount of money that can be diverted from the federal share of Medicaid disproportionate-share hospital payments. For some states these payments represent a sizable sum, making this an attractive financing option. But other states, such as Oregon and Minnesota, have relatively few disproportionate-share dollars to fuel eligibility expansions. Also, to the extent that disproportionate-share hospital payments are being used to subsidize uncompensated care, a large number of persons may remain uninsured after reform, so hospitals' needs may continue to be high. 4 For example, Florida will only gradually divest disproportionate-share funds to avoid sudden funding reductions for hospitals.
Third, states may be limited in their ability to generate new revenues. This is especially true if a state has to replace the revenues it had obtained through provider taxes and donations. In 1991 the Medicaid Voluntary Contributions and Provider-Specific Tax Amendments eliminated states' ability to use provider donations and restricted their ability to use provider taxes. Some states that have extensively used disproportionate-share hospital payments must generate new revenues to replace provider taxes and donations. Understandably, states have difficulty raising taxes.
Finally, states may vary in their ability to cut other public health programs. Many states can reduce spending on existing programs and cover essentially the same services in a waiver program. In other cases, programs simply are cut. These cutbacks can have adverse consequences for important programs and for the persons who need these services.
Economic issues. A critical issue for the success of insurance expansions is whether employers will continue providing health coverage. Even if existing businesses continue coverage, new businesses may be less likely to offer health insurance, given the existence of an expanded Medicaid program. If employer financing of coverage of low-income persons declines substantially, there is a huge potential for shifting the cost of financing care for such persons to Medicaid. The result may be a shift in the source of financing rather than an expansion of coverage. States could avoid this with an employer mandate, although this may not be politically feasible. An alternative-to bar persons from the waiver program if they have had employer-sponsored coverage, say, within the past year-is not completely satisfactory either. Many persons change jobs to increase earnings or lose jobs involuntarily and would be penalized by this type of waiting period.
A second economic issue is the impact of the waiver on work incentives. The expansion of Medicaid to all persons below 100 percent of poverty may encourage those on welfare to find employment when health insurance is no longer tied to welfare eligibility. Moreover, under a waiver, persons can enroll in private plans and may be able to keep the same plan and health care providers, even when they take a new job. But the work incentives for those above 100 percent of poverty may be more problematic. If an expanded Medicaid program covers all persons below 100 percent of the federal poverty line, persons with incomes above this line may be encouraged to work less in order to qualify for health coverage. If premium contributions rise with income, workers face a high marginal tax rate on earnings. This might encourage some to leave welfare and obtain low-wage jobs, but their incentives to move up the earnings ladder may be more limited.
Implementation issues. Enrollment. Rapid enrollment in managed care has not been as easy as anticipated for many states. Persons who have previously used a Medicaid card to obtain care from hospitals, physicians, or clinics must now select a health plan. If unable to select one, they are assigned to a plan. Providing information to clients on how to select plans and obtain services through these plans takes time. For example, in Hawaii, Rhode Island, and Tennessee information on which doctors participate in each plan was not available when the programs began. In some cases, persons attempt to obtain services from their usual doctor, only to find out that he or she is not in the plan they have selected. Many enrollees have switched plans after finding that the plan they selected does not offer access to the physicians and hospitals that they wish to use. This "chaos effect" that has occurred in some of the first waiver programs-at least in the start-up phase-may dampen states' enthusiasm for using this approach.
A variety of difficult administrative problems are associated with enrollment. Some states, including Oregon and Tennessee, have attempted to use streamlined eligibility applications, which contain less information on income than earlier Medicaid applications contained. But such data are important in determining eligibility and premium contributions, which can vary with income. If simplified applications or infrequent redeterminations fail to measure real changes in income, then states may be covering ineligible people or charging premiums that are too low or too high.
A related enrollment problem is collection of revenues. Low-income persons who are required to make monthly payments may not always have available funds. It is not practical to enroll persons in one month and disenroll them in the following month when they are not able to make their premium payments. This issue is exacerbated when people are locked into a managed care organization for, say, six months. What happens when they are unable to make premium contributions? Does it simply become a revenue shortfall to the plan, or to government? Or will they be subject to bill collection for months or years to come?
Two other long-term implementation problems concern the structure of premium contributions and the possibility of adverse selection. How much participation is likely to occur, particularly when premiums, while subsidized, are high relative to income? Enrollment in Hawaii and Oregon is exceeding expectations, while participation in Tennessee and Rhode Island has been lower than anticipated. Moreover, who will participate? Voluntary subsidized insurance arrangements also can lead to considerable risk selection. To the extent that persons with greater health risks enter these programs, average costs will increase and the number of people who can be served may be less than anticipated.
Managed cure. Managed care issues center on how many plans exist, whether they can be developed, how fast, and at what cost. Some states, such as Minnesota, Oregon, and Rhode Island, have a well-developed managed care industry; in others, such as Tennessee and Kentucky, managed care is only beginning to develop. In many states a wide variety of plans are called managed care. In some cases managed care is little more than discounted fee-for-service, perhaps with a "gatekeeper" who is required to approve admissions to hospitals and referrals to specialists. Little is really known about the cost-effectiveness of gatekeeper programs. Many such programs fall short of the true image of managed care in which physicians and hospitals operate within a highly organized administrative structure that not only provides insurance arrangements but also strong incentives for all providers to provide preventive services, arrange for care in the most efficient setting, provide care for complicated cases according to well-developed protocols, and so forth. Staff-model HMOs are less able to grow quickly in response to a mass shift to managed care, however, so gatekeeper or discounted fee-for-service plans generally have dominated waiver programs.
A serious issue is whether the types of health plans developing in response to waiver programs can successfully contain costs to the levels anticipated. In most cases, the bidding process for managed care organizations locks in premiums for the first year or so. But what will happen in subsequent years? If plans cannot survive in a world of low premiums and low premium growth, then the savings states anticipate may not be achievable. States may need to increase premiums more quickly to assure the survival of existing plans. If too many plans fail, a state may not have enough managed care organizations in which to place its beneficiaries. If too few plans exist, it will become more difficult to negotiate favorable capitation rates, and this will limit savings even further.
Another concern is the possible impact of managed care on the provider infrastructure that has historically served the poor, such as public and/ or teaching hospitals, community health centers, family planning clinics, and local health departments. For many waiver applications, the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) has required states to include access to these organizations or to demonstrate that comparable services are available. Health centers' objections to the waiver programs have been one of the biggest implementation problems in Rhode Island and Hawaii. The National Association of Community Health Centers has sued the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) to stop the Section 1115 waivers because it believes that health centers are endangered. In many states, including Rhode Island and Hawaii, community health centers are establishing their own health plans, which may make their provision of services more efficient. But if these new plans succeed, health centers' ability to provide care to persons remaining uninsured may be compromised. States that acknowledge the need to maintain providers dedicated to serving the poor could establish supplementary payment systems to help these providers make the transition into managed care. This, however, would increase the state's expenditures.
An additional implementation problem is that of setting capitation rates. Medicaid includes persons with a wide range of health problems. This is particularly true in states that are attempting to include the aged, blind, and disabled in managed care. States face the complex problem of establishing capitation rates that will encourage plans to enroll difficult-to-serve persons while limiting the incentives to underserve them. Failure to accurately set capitation rates invites the risk that persons with complex health problems will be segregated in a small share of the plans contracting with the state. In turn, this would threaten the plans' viability, not because they are inherently inefficient, but because they have enrolled too many persons with high health risks. Based on such concerns, Tennessee has already decided to provide supplemental payments to plans that enroll disabled persons. If the states cannot establish capitation rates to prevent risk selection, they need to develop alternative mechanisms, such as reinsurance, to compensate plans that enroll high-risk persons.
Provider opposition, The fourth major obstacle to expansion of Medicaid managed care plans is the potential opposition of providers. In some states physicians and hospitals have supported Medicaid expansions. In other states they have strongly objected to expansions based on payment rates. Most notably, the Tennessee Medical Association brought a lawsuit (which was eventually dismissed) against the state over payment rates under TennCare. In Hawaii and Florida physicians sought to stall or stop the waiver programs legislatively. In contrast, physicians in Oregon and Rhode Island were generally supportive of the waiver programs. If Medicaid is to be used to significantly expand access beyond just the poor, opposition of providers is likely to grow. Physicians are likely to object to low payment rates and utilization controls imposed by managed care organizations. Hospitals are likely to object to the loss of disproportionate-share payments, the discounts they are required to provide to managed care organizations, and the loss of patients.
Congressional opposition. Finally, Congress might ultimately oppose substantial Medicaid expansion. Although waiver programs are supposedly budget-neutral, Medicaid expenditures could end up being higher than they otherwise would have been. While spending increases may not be obvious because of the complexity of measuring waiver performance against original state budget projections without reform, increases at, say, doubledigit rates would be difficult to ignore. The higher rates of growth in Medicaid that may occur with substantial expansion of waiver programs could increase the likelihood that entitlement caps or other stringent cost controls ultimately will be imposed.
Potential Gains And Problems
Despite the unraveling of federal health care reform efforts this year, several states initiated potentially important changes in their health care systems. The Section 1115 waiver authority gives states considerable flexibility to restructure their Medicaid programs, including making changes to eligibility, benefits, and provider reimbursement. At least eight states have been approved to conduct these demonstration programs, to significantly reform the way health care is provided and paid for under their Medicaid programs. Moreover, many more states (such as Massachusetts, Minnesota, Illinois, and New Hampshire) hope to make comparable reforms to their Medicaid programs in the near future.
Widespread use of 1115 waiver programs among the states has the potential to cover large numbers of the uninsured. Once these persons have coverage, it will be very difficult to take it away. However, the costs could be substantial, depending on how many people take advantage of subsidies and whether employers drop current coverage, and also on states' success in achieving savings through the use of managed care.
There are a number of important advantages to the use of the Section 1115 waivers to expand coverage. The first is that it represents a new way of generating additional funding for health insurance coverage. As we have argued, there seems to be some new federal money, and persons are sometimes making contributions for their own health care coverage for the first time. Second, the approach may eliminate welfare stigma by relying on private plans. It has the potential to enroll persons in mainstream plans, thus improving access and quality. Third, it may improve the work incen- tives for many low-income Americans, although, as we have argued, the work incentive effects of this approach are limited.
Fourth, the approach may foster broader health care delivery system reform. It offers the opportunity to encourage the development of HMOs and to use nonphysician practitioners to serve not only low-income persons but also the broader market.
Finally, there is the possibility of reducing the rate of growth in costs relative to what otherwise would have occurred. We have argued that baseline projections might overstate the level of spending that would have occurred without reform. But it is also possible that the growth in wellorganized managed care programs could achieve a lower rate of growth than would have occurred without reform.
But there are a number of questions that can be raised about the strategy. The first issue is whether there will be real improvements in access to care.
Will persons obtain coverage in private managed care plans that in reality results in more limited access to physicians and hospitals? Will it result in the segregation of the poor into low-cost managed care organizations that are established solely for serving this population? Second, how difficult will it be to assure reasonable standards of quality alongside aggressive attempts to control both the level and rate of growth in costs? Third, will employers drop coverage, or will workers drop their employer-sponsored coverage, thereby causing a shift from employer financing to government financing with little increase in overall coverage? Fourth, will the institutions that have historically served the poor be harmed before managed care plans evolve that can replace their key functions? Fifth, what will be the consequences if states cut or eliminate state public health programs to contain revenue to expand insurance coverage? Sixth, what will happen if managed care savings do not materialize? Will states reduce enrollment and cut benefits, or will they increase revenues to maintain the program? Finally, how will the federal government react to continuing increases in Medicaid spending? Will the expansion of the Section 1115 waivers become a further impetus for entitlement caps or other Medicaid cuts?
It is too early to know how successful the new demonstration states will be in achieving their fundamental goals of expanding access to care while controlling costs. Despite this, many states believe that they cannot wait any longer and have applied to test comparable strategies with their Medicaid programs. Given the absence of federal action on health care reform, the strategy of using Medicaid as a building block for reform is a positive development. It is one, however, that must be watched carefully to be sure that it does not cause more problems than it solves. 
